Wyclif’s posi-tion in De Trinitate appears to be a response to the kinds of positions held by Adam Wodeham and Robert Holcot, who both denied the in-clusion of theology among the sciences. The vigor of Adam Wode-ham’s rejection of Walter Chatton’s position in his Sentences com-mentary [I.d.1 q.2] might lead one to imagine that Wyclif’s position is a direct response to Wodeham’s, on Chatton’s behalf.12 Given the lack of edited Sentences commentaries of the period following Wode-ham and Holcot at Oxford, it is impossible at this point to prove or disprove such an hypothesis; the best we can do in this discussion is to hold Holcot and Wodeham as proponents of the kind of position against which Wyclif argued.
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Robert Holcot’s position was that what is evident as scientific knowledge is born from demonstrative arguments; no faith is in-volved in the process. His argument is that theology could only be considered a science if it conformed to one of the three senses in which the term scientia is understood. In the broadest sense, it is firm adhe-sion to the truth, and in this sense theology is a science. But the ques-tion of the basis for that adhesion then arises. If the assent is based in evident knowledge of some truth grounded in empirical data, or in necessary first principles, then one cannot include theology among the sciences, for no viator can claim empirical knowledge nor intuitive comprehension of supernatural truths as necessary first principles.23
But the matter is more complex than this; Holcot is not suggest-ing that formal reasoning has no place in theological investigations. While he is clear that the Catholic ought accept as true on author-ity of Scripture or the Church propositions that might otherwise be rejected, one can—and in some cases must—use logic to investi-gate theological statements and arguments. With heretics, it is best to stick to analysis of the forms of arguments they use, and leave the divergence in content to ecclesiastic authority Theologians must be well versed in logic, though, as sophistic arguments frequently arise that require careful parsing. In some cases, he continues, good rea-soning can break down when addressing particularly difficult sub-jects, as with the nature of the Trinity. The syllogism “this thing is the Father,” “this same thing is the Son,” therefore “the Father is the Son” is perfectly acceptable by Aristotle’s reasoning, yet the conse-quence cannot be accepted, even if the premises are. Understanding the limits of human logic, he suggests, is one of the first requirements of theological investigation.24
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Holcot was famous as the eminent Dominican theologian in Ox-ford, and his works were studied well into the sixteenth century. Hol-cot’s theological position is not easy to delineate with terms familiar to the twenty-first century reader. Leonard Kennedy emphasizes his tendency to philosophical skepticism, suggesting that his position in-spired with those of Nicholas of Autrecourt and John of Mirecourt.103Others argue that equating Holcot’s unwillingness to recognize huWy cL i f’S tr i n i t a r i a na n d ch r iS t oL o g i c aL th e oL o g y167man logic’s applicability to theological truths is less indicative of skep-ticism than it is of his evolving understanding of the right approach to ordering reason in the life of faith.104 Kennedy describes Holcot’s chris-tology very briefly, noting that he devoted only a half-page to the In-carnation in his 248 page Sentences commentary, and appends a Quod-libet (58) “Whether God can make an impeccable rational nature” to his study.105 Here Holcot says, “Although the rational creature could be placed in such a disposition such that he could not sin for the time in which he has it, yet this is not to say that he could not sin when the disposition is removed. And so, simply speaking, he is peccable. And so commonly it is said that a creature is made impeccable through grace, not nature.”106 Kennedy describes Holcot as having argued that, had Christ set aside that assumed nature, which was for Him possible, that it could have sinned. Indeed, there is no contradiction in holding that God could have united with a sinful and damned nature, in which case God could be both blessed and damned at once.107
